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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
vs.
SID K. SPENCER,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal From Third Judicial District State of Utah
Salt Lake County
Ron. Oscar W. McConkie, Judge

ABSTRACT OF RECORD
INFORMATION
(TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE)
6

The defendant, Sid K. Spencer, having been
heretofore duly committed to this court by
W. M. Burton, a committing magistrate of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, to answer to this
charge is accused by Calvin W. Rawlings, District Attorney of the Third Judicial District,
State of Utah, by this Information~ of the crime
of Perjury, committed as follows, towit:
That the said Sid K. Spencer, on the 31st day
of
::\fay, A. D., 1939, at the County of Salt Lake,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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State of Utah, committe-d perjury by
ing as follows:

testify~

''I have not driven a car at any time since
my license was revoked for drunken
driving''
contrary to the provismiis of the Statute of the
State of Utah, in such case made and provided,
and against the peace and dignity of the State
of Utah.

CALVIN W. RAWLlNGS,
District Attorney of the Third
Judicial District, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.

By BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS,
Assistant.
Defendant duly arraigned on July 8, 1939.
Defendant entered plea of not guilty on September 16, 1939.
Filed July 8, 1939.

MOTION TO QUASH INFORMATION
(TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE).
9

Now comes the above named defendant, and
without waiving the motion heretofore made,
but expressly reserving the same, moves the
court to quash the information in the above entitled cause upon the following grounds, towit:
1.

That said information does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a public offense or to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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charge this defendant with the commission of
an offense.
2

That no facts are set forth in said information
from which this defendant can determine with
what he is charged, or the offense attempted
to be alleged.
3
That the court has no jurisdiction of this defendant or the offense charged for the reason
that there was no complaint before the con1mitting magistrate charging this defendant
with any offense whatever.
4

That said Information does not con1ply with
the provisions of Article I, Section XII of the
Constitution of Utah in sufficiently advising
and informing the defendant of the nature and
cause of the accusation, and is not in compliance with the statutes and laws of Utah requiring the information to be direct and certain as to the offense charged and as to the
particular circumstances and facts, of the alleged or of any offense . and that the information contains mere generic terms and allegations ·without alleging particular facts and circumstanceR or acts constituting the transgressions alleged to have been committed by
the defendant.
10 \YHEREFORE this defendant prays that said
Information be quashed, that said case be dismissed and that he go hence without day.
HARRY GOLDBERG,
Attorney for Defendant.
Filed .July 13, 1939.
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MOTION TO DISMISS
('l'ITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE)'.
11 Now comes the above named defendant, and
moves to dismiss and quash the Information
on file herein upon the grounds and for the
reasons, towit:
1.
That the committing magistrate, W. M. Burton, did not have any jurisdiction whatever to
conduct a preliminary hearing in said cause
and did not have any jurisdiction of this defendant for the following reasons, to-wit:
(a) That there was no complaint filed before
said committing magistrate, W. M. Burton,
charging this defendant with any offense whatever.
(b) That the alleged complaint before the
said committing magistrate did not state any
fact or facts charging any offP-nse whatever,
and did not advise this defendant of any offense
alleged to have ·been comm'itted by him, and
was wholly insufficient to give said committing
m~gi.strate any jurisdiction whatever to conduct or hold a preliminary examination.
HARRY G-OLDBERG,
Attorney for Defendant.
Filed July 13, 1939.
MINUTE ORDER OVERRULING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH A1TD
MOTION TO DISMISS.
(TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE).
13 Defendant's motion to quash and motion to dismiss were submitted to the court without argument and by the court denied.
Dated September 9, 1939.
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DE:JL\KD FOR BILL OF P ...L\.R1'ICULARS
(TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE).
14 To the State of Utah and to the . A. ttorneys,
Calvin \V. Rawlings and Brigham E.
Roberts:
Demand for a bill of particulars is hereby
made upon you for the following:
The date or dates and places or locations that
the defendant, Sid K. Spencer, is alleged to
have driven an automobile since his license was
revoked for drunken driving; the name of the
witness or witnesses alleged to have seen the
defendant driving an automobile since. his
license was revoked; the questions asked the
defendant and the answers given by him upon
which questions and answers the defendant is
charged with having committed the crime of
perjury.
Dated this 13th day of September, 1939.
HARRY GOLDBERG,
Attorney for Defendant.
Filed September 13, 1939.

BILL OF PARTICULARS
(TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE).
15 Comes no'v the State of Utah and pursuant to
Section 105-21-9, Chapter 118, Laws of Utah,
1935, and her2by makes the following Bill of
Particulars, to wit:
That on the 23d day of April, 1939, the defendant
herein was charged with the crime of vioSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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lating Section 29, Chapter 45, Laws of Utah,
1933, in that he had on the 21st day of .April,
1939, in Salt Lake County, driven and operated
a n10tor vehicle, towit, an automobile upon a
highway within the County of Salt Lake, State
of Utah, towit, in the 3500 block ,on Highland
Drive; and that at said time that said defendant
did not have a driver's license, the same having been revoked on the 14th day of June, 1938.
Said charge was. made against the defendant
by a complaint sworn to by E. L. Jensen and
filed before Arthur B. Bringhurst, the duly
elected, qualified and acting Justice of the
Peace within and for the Third Precinct, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.
That thereafter the said defendant pleaded Not
Guilty to said charge, and on the 31st day of
May, 1939, said ease was being tried before the
said J us.tice of the Peace, and the defendant
was sworn on his oath, and on s'aid day was
called as a witness in said case, and at said time
and place testifed while so under oath, as
follows:
''I have not driven a car at any time since
my license was revoked for drunken
driving''
16 and said testimony was material to the issues
of said case and said testimony was then and
there untrue and not the fact; and the driver's
license of said defendant had been revoked on
the 14th day of June, A. D. 1938.
CALVIN \V. RAWLINGS,
District Attorney.
Filed September 16, 1939.
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EXIDBIT LIST
Plaintiff's Exhibit A: Complaint filed in case
No. 11059. Received.
Defendant's Exhibit 1: District Court file No.
11054. Received.
25 Filed October 6, 1939.

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.
26 Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury:

1.
The defendant, Sid K. Spencer, is, charged by
the Information of the District Attorney, with
~aving committed the crime of perjury, as
follows:
That the said Sid K. Spencer, on the
31st day of May, A. D. 1939, at the County
of Salt Lake, State of Utah, commUted
perjury by testifying as follows :
"I have not driven a car at any time since
my licen~e was revoked for drunken
driving ''
contrary to the provisions of the Statute of the
State of Utah, in such case made and provided,
and against the peace and dignity of the State
of Utah.

2.
27 To the charge contained in the Information, the
defendant has entered a plea of not guilty,
which plea puts in issue all of the material
allegations of thf\ Information, and casts upon
thC\ State the burden of proving, beyond a
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reasonable doubt, every essential fact cons,tituting the crime charged in the Information.

3.
Before you can convict the defendant, the evidence must establish to your satisfaction, beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every
material fact charged in the Information as
follows, towit:
'
That the said Sid K. Spencer committed perjury by testifying as follows : ''I have not
driven a car at any time since my license was
revoked for drunken driving;'' that the offense
was committed on or about --the 31st day of
May, 1939; and that it was committed in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.

4.
The fact that the defendant has been held by
the magistrate to this court, or that an Information has been filed, does not constitute any
evidence that defendant is guilty, and it cannot be regarded by you as evidence.

5.
28

A person is guilty of perjury who swears or
affirms that he will truly testify in colinection
With any action, bearing or inquiry, or on a.ny
occasion in which an oath is required by law,
and who in such action or proceeding, wilfully
and knowingly testifies falsely.

6.
a. A person is guilty of perjury in the first
degree who commits perjury as to any material
matter in or in connection with any action or
special proceeding, civil or criminal, or any
hearing or inquiry involving the ends of public justice, or on an occasion on which an oath
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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29 or affirmation is required or may lawfully be
administered.
b. A person is guilty of perjury in the second
degree who commits perjury under circumstances not an1ounting to perjury in the first
degree.

7.
You are instructed that if you find from the
evidence that the defendant was a witness in
the court of Justice of the Peace Arthur B.
Bringhurst, in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, on the 31st day of :May, 1939, and was
sworn on oath in the proceeding· then before
said court to testify to the truth the whole
.
'
truth and nothing hut the truth; then before
you can find the defendant guilty you must also
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that when so
testifying he made the statement in language,
effect and meaning substanti:llly as alleged in
the Information filed herein, that is to say:
"I have not driven a car at any time since rny
license was revoked for drunken driving;'' and
you must further find that said statement was
false. If, therefore, you find that the state~
ment above quoted was not in substance or
effect, the statement made by the defendant
when so testifying, but that he stated in substance or effect: '' T haYe not driven a car at
iO any time since 1 was arrest(~d for driving without a driver's license,'' thon you are instructed
to find the defendant not guilty.

8.
You are instructed that before you can convict
the defendant~ you must be convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt:
.
1. That while testifying- as a witness in
the Law
Justice's
Court
ofprovided
S8ltby theLake
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding
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10
on the 31st day of May, 1939, defendant
was asked the question substantiaJly .as·
follows: ''Have you driven a car at any
time since your license was revoked for
Jrunken driving~" And the defendant
answered substantially: ''No, I have not
driven a car at any time since my lic~se
was revoked for drunken driving.'' ·
2. That said answer was false because
defendant did drive a car at Highland
Drive and Maple Avenue on April 21,
1939.
If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt as to either of these elements of the
State's case, you are instructed to find the defendant not guilty.

9.
You are instructed that if you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was driving his car at Highland Drive and
Maple Avenue on the 2h;t clay of April, 1939,
then you are instructed to find the dPfendant
not guilty.
10.
31

It is vour dutv to consider all of the evidence
together, fairly, impartially, and conscientiously. You should arrive at your verdict solely
upon the evidence introduced before you upon
the trial. You should not consider, nor should
you be influenced by any evidence offered but
not admitted, or by any evidence stricken out
by the court, or by any statement of counsel,
as to what the evidence is, unless it is correctly
stated, or by any statement of counsel of facts
not shown in the evidence, if any such has been
made, nor by any statement of the court in
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ruling upon questions of law in your hearing,
if any have been made that seem to indicate
any opinion of the court's upon any question
of fact.

1L
You are the sole judge of the weight of the
evidence, the credibility of the witnesses
the facts. In weighing the testimony you m-ay
consider the bias of any witness, if any is
shown, to testify in favor of or against either
party; the interest if any is shown, which any
witness has or may have in the result of the
trial. You may consid~r the appearance of the
witnesses on the witness stand, and any motive
or probable motive which any witness may have
to tell that which is not true, and from all the
facts and circumstanc~s given in evidence before you, determine what weight ought to be
given to the testimony of any witness. You
are not bound to believe all that the witnesses
32 may have testified to, nor are you bound to
believe any witness; you may believe one witness as against many, or many witnesses as
against one. In case there is a conflict in the
testinwny of the witnesses, it is your duty to
reconcile such conflict so far as you can, but
it is still for you to determine where the ultimate truth of the ease is. If you believe that
any witness has wilfully testified falsely as to
any material fact in the case, you are at liberty
to disregard the whole of the testimony of such
witness, except as he may have been corroborated by creditable witnesses or creditable
evidence in the case.
12.
In every crime or puhlic offense there must be
a
union or joint operation of ar.t or intent. The
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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intent or intention is manifested by the cireumstanres connected with the offense, and the
sound mind and discretion of the· accused.
13.

All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a man is
presumed to be innocent until he is proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case
of a reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt
is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an
acquittal. By a reasonable doubt is meant a
doubt based on reason, and which is reasonable
in view of all the evidence. If, after an impartial consideration and comparison of all the
evidence in the case, you can candidly say that
you are not satisfied of the defendant's ~ilt,
you have a reasonable doubt; but if. after such
impartial consideration and comparison of all
the evidence, you can truthfully say that you
33 have an abiding conviction of the defendant's
guilt, such as you would be \villing to act upon
in the more weighty and important matters relating to your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. It must be a real, substantial
doubt, and not one that is merely possible or
imaginary. It should fairly, naturally and
reasonably arise out of the evidence or lack of
Pvidence in the case. Proof beyond a reason'l hlP floubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding
of those who are bound to act conscientiously
u-pon it.
14.
To warrant you in convicting the defendant,
the evidence must, to your minds, exclude
every reasonable hypothesis other than that of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the guilt of the defendant. That is to say, if
after an entire consideration and comparison
of all the testimony in the case, you can reasonably explain the facts given in evidence on any
reasonable gTound other than the guilt of the
defendant, you must acquit him.
15.
34 ·When you retire to deliberate you should

appoint one of your number foreman. Your
verdict must be in \Yriting, signed by your
foreman, and when found, mus.t be returned
by you into court. Your verdict must be guilty
of perjury in the first degree as charged in the
Information, or guilty of perjury in the second
degree as charged in the Information. or not
guilty, as your deliberations may result. It
requires unanimous concurrence of an jurors
to find a verdict.
OSCAR W.
Filed

OctobE~r

McCO~KIE,

Judge.

6, 1939.

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
TION NO.1.

INSTRUC-

3il You are instructed that if you find from the
evidence that the defendant was a ·witness in
the court of Justice of the Peace Arthur B"
Bringhurst, in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, on the 31st day of JYiay, 1939, and was
sworn on oath in the proceeding then before
said court to testify to the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth; then before
you can find the defendant guilty you must also
doubt,
thatof Museum
when
so Services
find,
a reasonable
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Law Library. Funding
for digitization provided
by the Institute
and Library
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
testifying he made the statement in language,
effect and n1eaning substantially as alleged in
the information filed herein, that is to say:
"I have not driven a car at any time since my
license was revoked for drunken driving;'' and
you must further find that said statement was
false. If, therefore, you find that the statement above quoted was not in substance or
effect the statement made by the defendant
when so testifying, but that he stated in substance or effect: ''I have not driven a car at
any time since I was arrested for driving without a driver's license,'' then you are instructed
to find the defendant not guilty.
Given as amended with pen.
OSCAR W. McCONKIE, Judge.

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.2.
36 You are instructed that if you believe from 1he
evidence that the defendant was a witness in
the court of Justice of the Peace Arthur B.
Bringhurst, in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, on the 31st day of May, 1939, and was
sworn on oath in the proceeding then before
the court to testify to the truth, then, before
you can find the defendant guilty of the charge
in the Information, you must also be convincefl
hevond a reasonable doubt that at said time and
pl~ce he was asked, in substance and effect:
''Have you driven a car at any time since
your lieense was revoked for drunken
driving~''

and you must further find that his answer to
said question was :
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"No, I have not driven a car at any time
since my license was revoked for drunken
driving.''
and that said answer was false. If, therefore,
you find from the evidence that the defendant
was not asked the question,
"HaYe you driven a car at any time since
your license was revoked for drunken
driving~''

but was asked another and different question,
in substance and effect as follows:
"Have you driven a car at any time since
you were arrested for driving ·without a
driver's license?''
then you are instructed to find the defendant
not guilty.
Given in substance.
OSCAR W. McOONKIE, Judge.

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.4.
38 You are instructed that if you believe from the
evidence that when defendant was a witness in
the Justice's Court on May 31st, 1939, he was
not asked the question:
"Have you driven a car at any time since
your license was revoked for drunken
driving1''
but that the question then propounded to him
waR, in substance and effect:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Have you driven your car at any time
since you were arrested for driving without
a license"'''
then you are instructed to find the defendant
not guilty.
Refused.
OSCAR \V. McCONKIE, Judge.
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.5.
39 The defendant is charged with stating while
testifying unC.er oath in the court of Justice
of the Peace on May 31st, 1939:
"I have never driven a car at any time
since my license was revoked for drunken
driving.''
and that said statement was false.
The court instructs you that to convict the defendant, you must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that defendant did make the particular statement jn substance and effect as
above quoted and that said statement was un~
true. In other words, the State must prove the
charge as stated in the Information. If, therefore, you believe from the evidence that defendant did not make said statement. but that his
testimony was that he had not driven a car since
his arrest for driving without a driver"s
license, then your verdict must he not guilty.
Given in substance.
OSCAR W. McCONKIE, Judge.
Filed October 6, 1939.
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VERDICT
rriTLE OF COURT AND CAUSE).
41 \Y e, the Jurors impaneled in the above case,
find the defendant guilty of Perjury in the
First DegTee as' charged in the Information.
ED\V. B.

BECKST~JAD,

Foreman.

Dated October 6, 1939.
Filed October 6) 1939.

NOTICE OF :MOTION FOR A NE·W TRIAL
(TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE).
44 To the State of Utah· and to Calvin W. Rawlings, District Attorney of the Third Judicial District of the State of Utah, in and
for Salt Lake County:
You and each of you will please take notice that
the defendant will move the court to set aside
the verdict and grant a new trial herein, upon
the following grounds:

L
Errors of law occurring during the course of
the trial.

2.
That the rulings of the court: (a) In permitting the District Attorney to interrogate the
defendant with ~eference to what occurred in
Judge Bringhurst's court, at the time the defendant was taken to said court immediatelv
after his arrest; (b) in permitting the Distridt
Attorney
to interrogate the defendant as to
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driving his car on other dates than April 21,
1939, after his license had been revoked, were
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
defendant.

a.
That the verdict is contrary to law.

4.
That the verdict is contrary to the evidence.
Said motion will he made upon the records and
files in said cause.
Dated this 9th day of October, 1939.
HARRY GOLDBERG,
JESSE R. S. BUDGE,
Attorneys for Defendant.
Filed October 10, 1940.

MINUTE ORDER OVERRULING MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL, AND JUDG.MEKT
AND SENTENCE OF THE COURT.
(TI'J..1LE OF COURT AND CAUSE).
48 Defendant's motion for a new trial having been
heretofore argued to the court by respective
counsel and submitted and by the court taken
under advisement and the- court now after considering said matter and all of the authorities
cited, orders that said motion be denied. This
being the time heretofore fixed for passing
of sentence, the defendant being present in
person and represented by Jesse Budge and
Harry Goldberg as counsel, and Calvin W.
Rawlings, District Attorney and Brigham E.
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ing in behalf of the State of Utah. Thereupon
the court asks the defendant if he has any
legal cause to show why judgment and sentence
should not be passed upon him at this time, the
defendant responding that he has none.
Whereupon the court pronounces the following
judgnaent and sentence:
It is the Judgment and Sentence of this
court that you, Sidney K. Spencer, be confined and imprisoned in the Utah State
Prison for the indeterminatE' term as pro'ided by law for thp crime of Perjury as
charged in the complaint.

OSCAR W. l\fcCONKIE, Judge.
Dated December 9, 1939.

CERTIFICATE OF ~ROBABLE CAUSE
(TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE).
G4 I, Oscar W. McConkie, the judge who, tried the
above entitled case, hereby certify that in my
opinion there is probable cause for an appeal.
Dated this 8th day of January, 1940.
OSCAR W. McCONKIE, Judge.
(Seal).
Filed January 8) 1940.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL
(TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE).
55

To the Clerk of the Above Entitled Court, and
to Calvin W. Rawlings, District Attorney
of the Third Judicial District, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah:
Please Take Notice, that the above named defendant, Sid K. Spencer, hereby appeals to the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah from that
certain order and judgment made and rendered
in the above entitled court, wherein and whereby this defendant was found guilty of perjury
in the first degree and on November 10, 1939
was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term
in the Utah State Prison for the crime of perjury, and from that order and judgment made
and rendered on or about the lOth day of Kovember, 1939, wherein and whereby this defendant's motion for a new trial was, by the above
entitled court, denied.
This appeal is taken upon questions of both
law and fact and from the whole of said judgment.
HARLEY W. GUSTIN,
JESSE R. S. BUDGFJ,
Attorneys for Defendant.
Filed January 9, 1940.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
(TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE).
6 I, ·William J. l(orth, Clerk of the above entitled court) do hereby certify that the above
and foregoing and hereto attached files contain all the original papers filed in this court
in the above entitled case, including the original
Bill of Eocceptions and Notice of Appeal, together with true copies of original orders made
by the court, the whole constituting the Judgment Roll therein. And that the same is a full,
true and correct ~ranscript of the record as it
appears in my office.
I further certify that a Certificate of Probable Cause, duly signed by the Honorable
Oscar vV. ~fcConkie, Judge, was filed on th~
8th day of January, A. D. 1940.
And I further eertify that an Undertaking on
Appeal, in due form, has been properly filed
and that the same was filed on the 8th day of
January, A. D. 1940.
And I further eertify that said Judgment Roll
is this date tran~mitted to the Suprerne Court
of the State of Utah, pursuant to sueh appeal.
Witness my hand and the Seal of said court at
S3.lt Lake City, Utah, this 24th day of Jannary, A. D. 1940.
WILLIAM J. KORTH,
Clerk Third Distriet Court.
By ALVIN KEDDINGTON,
(Seal).
Deputy Clerk.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS
(TrrLE OF COURT AND CAUSE).
57

The above entitled cause came on regularly tor
trial before the Honorable Oscar vV. ~IcConkie,
one of the judges of said court, and a jury, on
the 4th day of October, 1939, the State being
represented by Calvin W. Rawlings and H. D.
Lowry \and the defendant being represented
by Harry Goldberg and Jesse R. S. Budge.
·Whereupon, the following proceedings, in substance, were had:

60

It was conceded on the part of the defendant
that his driver's license was revoked on the
14th day of June, 1938 for a per·iod of one year
and that the defendant was so notified, and
that license had not been returned.

61

B. R. McDONALD, a witness called on behalf
of the State, testified substantially aR
follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION:
By Mr. Rawlings:
62 l,am connected with the State Road Patrol and
have been for the past nine years as Sergeant.
of the Salt Lake District. On the 21st dav of
April, I had occasion to be down near ?\f arl0
Avenue and Highland Drive where we had a
blockade, checking driver's licenses. This wa~
about five o'clock in the afternoon.
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..::\.RTHUR B. BRINGHURST, a witness called
on behalf of the State, testified substan63
tially as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By l\Ir. Rawlings:
64 I am the Justice of the Peace of the Third Precinct and have been since the 1st day of January, 1939. Sid Spencer was in my court at
my home on the 21st day of April of this year.
65 Mr. Jensen, a highway patrolman, was with
him. In a file of the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah No. 11059, entitled State of Utah v. Sid
K. Spencer. filed June 27, 1939 there appears
a paper which is denominated "complaint'' in
the case of State of Utah v. Sid K. Spencer and
the:r:e appears on this complaint the name of
E. L. Jensen, also Arthur B. Bringhurst, Justice of the Peace. This complaint was filed in
my court and bears my signature and the Eignature of Mr. ,Jensen.
MR. RAWLINGS: We offer the original complaint.

Q. When was this complaint filed t
A. It was filed on the 21st day of Ap!il.
MR. BUDGE; I move to strike that answer
as not the best evidence.
66 THE COURT: I \viii deny the motion to
strike.
THE COURT: Any objection to the complaint1
MR. BUDGE: Yes. Object to it upon the
ground it wasn't filed.
THE COURT: Objection is overruled. We
will
admit
the
comp~aint
in byevidence.
I and
preSponsored by the S.J. Quinney
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sume it should be known as Exhibit A, but not
1narked perhaps~
MR. RAWLINGS: That is right.
67 The file date of April 25th appears on the complaint but it was filed on the 21st. There is an
error somewhere that I did not notice. The
case predicated and based on this eomplaint
was tried in my court first on ~lay 19th and
th~n reopened for hearing· on :\fay 31st by
stipulation. Spencer did not take the stand on
the 19th but he did on the 31st of May. Prior
to his testifying, I administered the oath to
him. Mr. Spencer took the oath. J. Patton
68 Neeley represented the State of Utah in that
trial and asked the defendant some questions
on cross-examination.
Q. I will ask you to state whether or not Mr.
Neeley asked J\ifr. Spencer, the defendant in
this case and the defendant in that case, a
question relative to whether or not he had
driven his automobile since his driver'~ license
had been revoked for drunken driving'F
MR. BUDGE: Object to that as leading,
sugg1estive.
THE COURT: Objection overruled.
69

A. He asked him that question, if he had
driven since his license was revoked. He said,
''I have not drjvcn Iny car since my licence was
revoked.'' This statement was made on the
31st day of May this year.
CROSS - EXAMINATION:

By Mr. Budge:
70 I am 41 years old. I remember in substance the
question that was· propounded to Spencer by
Neeley. I cannot remen1ber all the questions
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that were asked. I reme1nber that question and
I remember in substance other questions. I
cannot say that I remember the exact words
of that question but I do not think they were
worded differently from what counsel stated
in any material aspect. The words used were
the ones used to the best of my recollection. 1
do not think I am incorrect about the words.
70 I do not recall whether or not he merely answered ''no.'' This was on May 31, 1939. I
71 am sure that he didn't say merely ''no.'' I
do not recall the exact words of any other
question that was propounded to him.
72 I remember the other questions only in substance. He was asked if his wife was driving
the car and I remember his answer that it was
a nice day and he thought he would take his
wife out and learn her to drive the car that
morning and that she was driving. I remember
in the proceeding· a witness by the name of
Glen Hastings.

Q. And do you remember a question that was
propounded to him by Mr. Hanson on that
occasion~

A. Well, now, I think he was the one that drove
71 for 1\f r. Spencer for sometime. I recall that
"\Villard Hanson, attorney for M.r. Spencer,
upon that occasion on the 31st dav of l\1ay,
1939, in my court asked Mr. Has.ti~gs in sub~
Rtance or effect, "How long have you been
driving· Spencer's car for hin1 ~'' He a~ked him
if he had been driving his car but I do not re~
member of his asking if he had been driving
since his (Spencer's) license was revoked. I
do
not remember that that question was asked
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him and that Mr. Neeley objected to it that it
was immaterial nor sustained an objection to
1\1:r. Hanson's question. I remember sustaining
objections but not to those questions. I do
not remember what questions I sustained objections to. There were quite a number of
them.
78 Q. Do you now recall, Mr. Bringhurst, that
Mr. Hanson asked him the question in subs~ance
or effect, ''Have you beer.n driving1 this car
for Mr. Spencer since his licenRe was revoked?"
A. I don't remember ''since his, license was
revoked.'' I know he asked if he had been
driving his car. I do not remember what question it was that I sustained Mr. Neeley's objection to.
79 Q. Now, isn't it true that after Mr. Hanson had
propounded that question and you sustained
the objection, that the witne>3s (Hastings) was
excused.
MR~ R.&WLINGS:
Now, Your Honor, he
stated his recollection was that Mr. Hanson
did not propound that question and it wasn't
answered; and now he is asked if after this
happened, when he says it didn't happen, didn't
he do something; ana if he says, ''yes, he did
something,'' then he would say not only that
he did something but also answer in the affirmative the other question.
THE COURT: I a~ inclined to think that
that objection ought to be sustained.
80

Mr. Hastings on that occasion was asked if he
had been drivinf.! a car for 1\fr. Spencer and he
was asked for how long he had been driving
the car but I have forgotten the answer as to
the exact time. I have no recollection of Mr.
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:Keeley's objection to a question. He stated the
length of time that he had been driving the car
for .Mr. Spencer but I have forgotten how long
he had been driving and what he 8-aid.
81 Q. Well, you don't seem to remember these
questions that were asked him. You say you
remember the material ones. Now, what ones
do you remember!
82 Mr. Hastings was asked if he had driven for
Mr. Spencer and how long he had driven for
him. Those are the only two questions that I
remember and that is all I remember about his
testimony. I do not remember of Neeley making any objection. I remember that Mrs.
Spencer was on the stand in my court. She
said that she was driving the car and became
panicky when the officers stopped them because she didn't have an operator's license and
turned the car around and tried to get ttway
from the officers. I did not issue a complaint
against Mrs. Spencer but I signed a complaint
in the City Court charging Mrs. Spencer with
driving without a license based upon her statement in my court and at the request of Neeley,
the assistant county attorney.
83 I do not recall Mr. Neeley having asked I\Ir.
Spencer in substance or effect if he had driven
his car sinc.e he had been arrested for driving
without a license. I do not remember Mr.
Neeley saying, "vVhy, we have got proof of
your driving it in two instances since you were
arrested for driving1 without a license." It is
not true that Mrs. Spencer arose in the courtroom and said, "That is not true, Mr. Neeley,
even provided
hacked
it out
of andthe
because
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driveway.''
courtroom.

None .of that occurred in my

84 I signed a eomplaint against Speneer for perjury at Neeley's request. This was several
days after the trial. He called me on the telephone at hon1e and I went down to the City
Court and swore out the complaint.
It was
86 then stipulated that file No. 11054 in the District Cou:rt would be admitted in evidenee as
defendant's Exhibit 1.
87 After all of the evidenee had been introduced,
I signed a complaint against Mrs. Spencn· for
operating,a car ·without a license on the 21st
day of April, 1939 before Judge Burton and
swore to the complaint two or three days. after
the hearing. I signed the complaint against
l\irs. Spencer for driving· the car without a
license on th8 21st day of April, 1939 after I
had found Sid Spencer guilty of driving that
car on the 2'1st day of April. Mr. Spencer
88 wasn't found guilty until hvo days after the
hearing ::tnd I have forg'Otten whether I signed
the complaint against Mrs.. Spencer before I
rendered judgment in the case or after, but it
was a day or two after the hearing. In the
89 book entitled "Justice's Docket" and on page
163 is the record of the casA of State of Utah
v. Sid Spencer that I have been referring to
and on that page it Rays ''Sentence, Found
Guilty, May 31, 1939." It was on the 31st day
of !fay that I found him guilty.
RE-DTRECT EXAMINATION:
By l\fr. Rawlings:
90

Mrs. Spencer testified in court that she wa~
driving1 the car and that she didn't have a
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driver's license. I was present in court when
the matter was called ag·ainst .Mrs. Spencer.
I heard the court order the case dismissed.
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION:
By Mr. Budge:
91 I believe the case against Mrs. Spencer was
called for trial. I know it was dismissed. I
92 don't remember of any evidence being introduced. I do not remember Officer Jensen testifying in the case against :Mrs. Spencer.
HE-DIRECT EXAJ\1IN.A. TION:
By nir. Rawlings:
Q. And it was dismissed at the request of the
County Attorney, wasn't it~
A. That is right.
MR. BUDGE: I move to strike that and object to it as not being the best evidence.
93

94

THE COURT: I am inclined to think that a
strict observance of the rules, would have restrich~d some of these matters from going in ;
but he is testifying as to what he heard, and
I will let the record stand.

J. PATTON NEELEY, a witness called on behalf of the State, testified substantially
as follows :
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Rawlings:

95 I reside in Salt Lake City and have been connected with the County Attorney's office since
the 1st of October, 1938. I appeared in Judge
Bringhurst's
court
in theprovided
caseby the
ofInstitute
State
of Utah
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v. Spencer as a representative of the County
Attorney's office. The defendant took the
witness stand. The case was not tried all in
the same day. At the first hearing the State
put on its evidence and rested and Mr. Hanson,
Spencer's attorney, rested without putting on
any evidence. Mr. Spencer was found guilty
and then his attorney asked to re-open. On
the date that the case was re-opened Mr. Spencer took the stand. Judge Bringhurst was pre96 siding. Prior to taking the stand, Spencer
was sworn. On cross-examination I asked
Mr. Spencer if he had testified on direct examination if he had driven a car at any time
since his license had been revoked for drunken
driving; and Mr. Spencer answered no, that he
97 had not. Then I asked him if he hadn't driven
a car at any time, and he said, ''No, I have not
driven a car at any time since my license waR
revoked for drunken driving.''

CROSS - EXAMINATION:
By Mr. Budge:

98 I did not a.sk the question, ''Have you driven
your car since you were arrested for driving
without a license''' To my memory, l\ir. Hanson did not a.sk Mr. Hastings if l\ir. Spencer
had driven his car since his license was revoked.
Q. Well, now, to refresh your recollection,
didn't you then object to that question upon
the ground that it was immaterial and that the
only thing before the court was whether or not
Mr. Spencer had driven the car on the 21Rt of
April?

1\fR. RAWLINGS: Just a minute. I object
to that question on the ground that it l1a~:
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double-barrel answer. In the event he an~,n~rs one way or another, the answer to the
second part of the question THE COURT: Sustained.
99 As I remeinber ~lr. Hastings' testimony, he
testified simply to the effect that he had been
hired by :Jlr. Spencer to drive his car. I do
not recall making any objection to any questions propounded. At that time I did not ask
for a complaint against ~frs. Spencer oy reason
100 of her testimony. I think it was a day or two
later. As an officer in the County Attorney's
office, I instigated the proceedings against
101 l\lrs. Spencer. I do not remember whether Mr.
Bringhurst swore to the complaint or not, but
whoever swore to it, I asked them to and if
Bringhurst's name appears on the cOinplaint,
I asked him to swear to it. This was after
Spencer had been found guilty by .Judge
Bringhurst. I stated in the courtroom that a
102 complaint should be issued against Mr. Spencer
for perjury. I wasn't angry at him and I
wasn't e-xcited and I have had nothing to do
with the case against Mr. Spencer since the
preliminary hearing, and nothing to do with it
in the way of assembling proof. I have talked
103 with the District Attorney's office, but 1.vith
no witnesses.
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION:
By l\f r. Rawlings:
105 I was not in town when the preliminary hearing; took place. I said that a perjury con1plaint
should be issued. As County Attorney I felt
some responsibility. I was responsible for the
complaint being issued against Mrs. Spencer.
She testified that on April 21st she did not
have a drh'C'r 's license.
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l06

B. R. McDONALD, a witness on behalf of the
State, was recalled and testified substantially as follows:

EXAMINATION:
By Mr. Rawlings:

DIHl!~Crl,

107 On the 21st day of April, I was in the vicinity
of 1laple Avenue and Highland Drive. I was
there on a blockade. At that time, l\fr. Jensen
of the State Road Patrol arrested Sidney
Spencer. I have known Spencer for about five
or six years. I saw a car in that vicinitv that
attracted my attention. The car had just
stopped vrhen I saw it. I heard the car skidding in the gravel and turned around to see and
it had just stopped. I called to Mr. Jensen to
go down and check the automobile, and directed
108 him to make the arrest of the driver of the
car. The car backed up and went on east on
Maple Avenue. I saw Jen~.en get into his
automobile and follow the car east on Maple
A venue. A few minutes afterwards he came
109 back in his car with Mr. Spencer. There was
a convenmtion. I spokr to Spencer and asked
him how he was. He said) "Oh, for hell's sake,
Mac, give me a break and forget it." I said,
''How are you, Sid~''

110

ELDEN JENSEN, a witness on behalf of the
State, testified substantially as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Rawlings:

111 I live at Murray, Utah and am connected with
the State Road Patrol. I was near Maple
Avenue and Highland Drive on the 21st day of
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April this year working a blockade for driver's
licenses. Sergeant B. R. McDonald was in
eharge. I saw Sid Spencer there on that day
in a car that was parked right at the entrance
to Maple Avenue. The car was not in motion
112 when I saw it. Immediately after I first saw
it~ it started to back up. It w.as headed north
and sli@htly to the east of Highland Drive.
Sergeant :.McDonald called mv attention to it.
113 Sid Spencer was driving the. car. I followed
· the car and when I got out of my car and
walked towards it, Mr. Spencer was walking
around the front end of his car. I told him
he was under arrest. He asked for a moment
and walked back to his car and spoke to a lady
114 that was ill it. I heard Spencer say to McDonald, ''Mac~ can't you give me a break~''

Q. When you got down to Judge Bring~urst's
court, was there any conversation between the
judge and Spencer and you~
~.fR. BUDGE: Object to that upon the ground
it is immaterial, Your Honor.

116 THE COURT: The court is of the opinion
that the answer should be given.
117 While the judge was making out the complaint

he asked Mr ~ Spencer for his first name. He
stated that his first name was Lolo and I called
the judge's attention to the fact that this man
wasn't Lolo Spencer but Sid Spencer. He then
admitted that he was Sid Spencer.

Q. And after that did he give another address
when he said his name was Sid Spencer 1
A. Yes, he did.
Q. Do you recall wha.t the address was 1
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~fR. BUDGE: If Your Honor please, I move
to strike out all this testimony as not tending
to show the commission of this offense. There
isn't a word of it that has anything to d() Wlth
admitting the offense, no admission on the
part of Spencer as to what was done.

MR. RA\\7'LINGS: Your Honor, the only way
you can prove an act is by the intent, and the
118 only way you can prove an intent is to show
admissions and acts of defendant at the time
of arrest.
THE COURT: This doesn't go to his alleged
perjury, does it¥
MR. RAWLINGS: Yes. It does in this regard: It goes to the fact that he was driving
a car unlawfully on April 21, 1939.
THE COURT: That part - v.re are past that
Now, ~Ir. Budge isn't raising that point.
MR. BUDGE: No.
THE COURT: As to whether he was driving
the car.
MR. RAWLINGS: If 1vlr. Budge will stipulate
he was driving the car MR. BUDGE: \Vhy, no, but I say this testimony has nothing to do whether he was driving
the car or not.
THE COURT: What I say is that Mr. Budge
objected to that, but we are past that. The
court permitted that. Now he is making a
new objection that these statements relative to
giving a false name haven't anything to do
with this perjury charge.
MR. RAWLINGS: Yes they do, Your Honor,
because it shows the intent or it shows ·whether
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or not it gives the jury some evidence a.s to
whether or not Spencer was driving the car on
that day, on the :21st day of April of 1939.
MR. BUDGE: \Ye say that it doesn't relate at
all to whether he ·was driving or not.
119 :MR. RA \YLINGS: Here he is arrested for doing something that he shouldn't do; and when
he is asked his name, he gives a fictitious name,
which is evidence of the factMR. BUDGE: That he- was driving the car?
MR. RA \YLINGS: Evidence of the fact that
he would like to get away.
MR. BUDGE: Is that evidence that he was
driving the car? That's what this question is
supposed to relate to.
).fR. RAWLINGS: No, its evidence - he tries
to give it as evidence to shield him from his
act and shows that he knows the minute he's
arreHted that he's violating the law and tries
to avoid it by giving a fictitious name.
MR. BUDGE: That's just the imaginings of
counsel's disordered mind. This has absolutely nothing to do whatever with the question as
to whether he drove the car. Suppose he gave
his name as John Brown or John Doe or any
other name.
THE COURT: I rather think I ought to strike
that part of the record; order it striken.
1\fR. BUDGJ!:: And I ask
structed to disregard it.

th~t

the jury be in-

THE COURT: Yes. The jury was so admonished.
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MR. RAWLINGS: Now I would like to know
definitely what part is 'stricken.
THE COURT: The part referring to his giving a false narne. I take it that that's the only
part that there was a question raised upon.
MR. BUDGE : Will the court now, so that
we will have it in the record, instruct the jury
with respect to that~

MR. RAWLINGS: He just instructed them.
120 THE COURT: I did.
CROSS -EXAMINATION:
By Mr. Budge:
122 When Sergeant McDonald called my attention
to the car, I looked across and saw a man sitting at the wheel. I did not spe anyone else in
123 the car at the time. It was an Oldsmobile
coupe. I was about 100 feet away from the car
at the time. I did not see Spencer at the wheel
on any other occasion. The only time that I
124 saw Spencer was just as the car was ready to
s.tart backing. I arn not sure 'vhether the ear
was stopped or not. The car had not yet turned
into Maple Avenue when I first saw Sp( 11
128 As near as I know the car only had one seat.
It might be possible that there were other people in. the car besides 1fr. Spencer and the
lady.
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION:
By Mr. Rawlings:
129 Maple Avenue is a blind street. The first time
I noticed a woman in the car was when I came
back with Mr. Spencer. The car was. stopped
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130 at the tin1e. I did not look in the car. It was.
not a four-door sedan nor a two-door sedan.

RE-CROSS EXAMINATION:
By ~Ir. Budge:
131 \Vhen I got to the car I did not notice anyone
sitting in it. Later on I saw a lady sitting in
the car. She was sitting in the position under
the wheel. I followed the car approximately
three-quarters of a mile up .J[a.ple Avenue, from
Highland DriYe. I stopped my car at the. end
of Maple ..c.\_venue and walked over and talked
to ~Ir. Spencer. :Jiy car was stopped directly
132 behind his. He walked around the car and the
first I saw of him was in the position just
about head of the left front fender. This was
just as I got there. He met me at the back end
133 of the car. At that time I had not seen Mrs.
Spencer. We walked back to the car and Mrs.
Spencer was sitting under the wheel at that
time.
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By :Mr. Rawlings:
134 At the first time I saw the Spencer car turn on
the intersection of Maple Avenue on Highland
Drive, I only saw one person in the car. The
21st day of April was a clear day. The sun
was shining bright. It was just a few minutes
before 5:00 o'clock
143 It was stipulated that the· Third Precinct, Judge
Bringhurst's court and residence, are located
in Salt Lake County. Whereupon the State
rested.

l\fotion for dismissal.

1\IH. BUDG-E: We at this time move that the
raf'r be dismissed against the defendant on the
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ground that the evidence is insufficient to
prove a public offense or that the defendant
committed the public offense charged in the
Information.
150 THE COURT : I will deny_ your motion for
dismissal.

151

SID K. SPfJNCER, the defendant, was called
as a witness in his own behalf and testified
substantially as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Budge:
152 I am forty-one years of age and reside at 1677
Princeton Avenue in Salt Lake City. I have
resided in Salt Lake City all of my life. I was
present and called as a witness in the court of
Justice of the Peace Bringhurst on the 31st
day of May, 1939 and was present on the same
occasion when Glenn Hastings was called as a
witness, and heard the questions propounded
to Mr. Hastings.
Q. Do you recall a question that was propounded to Mr. Hastin~s by ·\Villard Hanson,
your coun~el, in that case?
A. I do.
153 Q. What was that ques,tion?
A. Mr. Hanson had askedMR. RAWLINGS: Just a minute. I think,
Your Honor, we will object on the ground that
it's immaterial and irrelevant.
154 THE COURT: I think I will sustain the objection to the question as stated.
155 I was interrogated on cross examination in
that hearing by Mr. Neeley. At the hearing
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on ~lay 31, 1939 I was not asked the question
in substance or effecct 7 ''Have you driven a
car at any time since your license was revoked
for drunken driving~'' The question tha.t 1\fr.
Xeeley asked me was, "Have you driven your
car at any time since you were arrested for
driving without a driver's license~" My answer to that was "no."

Q. After you had made the answer, what
occurred~

A. 1\lr. Keeley was very angry and jumped
upMR. RAvVLIKGS: Object to it as being inlmaterial and irrelevant. No bearing upon the
issues of the case at all
THE COURT: I don't see how Mr. Neeley's
blood pressure can in .any way throw any light
upon what lwppened as far .as his alleged
offense is concerned.
MR. BUDGE: Well because, if Your Honor
please, we want to show the staten1ent of 1\lr.
Neeley to this witness when he made an answer
to the question that \Ya.s propounded to show,
Your Honor, that that was the question before
the court and not the other question at all.
And this will develop the fact that the only
question before the court was whether he had
driven it since he had been arrested for driving
without a license.
156 MR. RAWLI~ GS : Counsel couldn't expect to
get a better answer than his witness saying hP
didn't answer that. May I call Your Honor's
attention to the fact that Your Honor has already sustained an objection to the same type
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
of Library
tP~timon~r
Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40

MR. BUDGE: If Your Honor please, I don't
like to do this, but I insist, if Your Honor
will permit me, that I be permitted without
interruption to address the court and not be
interrupted by counsel. I am trying to show,
if Your Honor please, that the question before
the court at that time wasn't the question of
whether he had driven his car since his license
was revoked. That was not the question, and
this testimony which I seek to develop will
show that it wasn't that question with which
the court was concerned, and that therefore
the crime of perjury wasn't committed there
because some other matter and some other issue
was the one that was involved there, as stated
by the County Attorney himself. If I am per·
mitted to show what the County Attorney did
state, I asked the. County Attorney about it
and he denied it. I want to show his denial is
not right, is not correct.

.MR. RAWLINGS: I call attention to the fact
that exactly the same matter has been argued
before Your Honor and Your Honor sustained
the objection.
THE COURT: I am wondering if this isn't
just a little different angle that the County
Attorney was int:errogated abiout, and ;the
County Attorney, as I remember, did deny.
157 MR. RAWLINGS: I don't have any objection
to him, if the County Attorney had been asked
questions upon which he could be impeached on
this thing. I wouldn't have any objection to
this witness coming in endeavoring to impeach
him properly, but to try and get this defense in
in the manner counsel is endeavoring to is im·
proper; is immaterial, irrelevant. He is bring-
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ing hearsay into the case, is laying the foundation for a probability, as he says himself.
THE COURT: I think we will all be better
satisfied if you have an opportunity to express
yourselves with the freedom that you can't
have in the presence of the jury, and so, htdies
and gentlemen, I am going to excuse you l¥ltil
tomorrow morning.
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1939; 10:00 A. l\L
158

(All Jurors and Defendant present).
THE COURT: \Ye didn't get through. Request has been made for some further discussions this morning on questions of law, so
it will be necessary for you to meander out in
the front lwll "ithout getting away from the
building or without getting away anywhere.
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
By Mr. Budge:
THE COURT : Now, let's see where we were
at when we recessed last night. Perhaps you
had bettf-r interrogate the 1citness if yo1~ remember what your subject was.
MR. BUDGE: I should like to have the reporter read the last qu~stion.

Q. After you had made that a.nswer to Mr.
N"eeley's question, "·hat occurred in the proceedings¥
~~rR.

RAWLINGS: And we objected to that
on the ground it is immaterial~ irrelevant, and
has no bearing on the issues of the case. Indefinite and uncertain. All hearsay.
159 THE COURT: The court has had considerable
trouble upon that question; and after thinking
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about it and after listening to the arguments,
I think the court ought to permit the witness
to answer the question.
Q. Just state what occurred, Mr. Spencer.
A. After I made an answer to that question,
Mr. Neeley said, ''Why, Sid, you have been
seen on two occasions driving your car since
you were arrested.''
Q. What else~
A. And at that time my wife, who was in the
courtroom, jumped up and said, '''Why, Mr.
Neeley- ''
MR. RAWLINGS: Your Honor, it seems to

usA. ''That isn't true.''
MR. RAWLINGS: Just a minute.
A. Pardon me.
MR. RAWLINGS: You have been on the
stand long enough to know. Object to it on the
ground that it's a conclusion of that witness.
It is hearsay, immaterial, irrelevant, what his
wife might say in this particular proceeding,
and I assume it is his wife.
MR. BUDGE: How could it be hearsay~
MR. R.A:WLINGS: In stating what she said1
MR. BUDGE: Why, yes. He was there and
your representative was there. State's representative was there. It's part of this action.
160 MR. RAWLINGS: Why not put her on the
stand and have her testify~
MR. BUDGE: I can't do it all at once.
~1R. RA·WLINGS: The-n let's have her testify.
I 'Yould rather have her testify.
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1\IR. BUDGE: I know what you would rather
have.
MR. RA \YLINGS: I want justice and that's
what you want.
MR. BUDGE: \Ye are going) to proceed in
our own way, i\Ir. Rawlings.

THE COURT: I think I will
stand.
A.

le~

the answer

My wife jumped up a,nd said -

THE COURT:
answer.
A. No.

I think you completed that

THE COURT: Well, if you did not, you may
complete it.
A. My wife jumped up and said, '''Why, Mr.
Neeley, that isn't true. My husband hasn't
backed the car out of the alleyway since he was
arrested.''

Q. Now what else occurred at that time~
A. And 1\[r. Neeley said "I want a complaint
filed against J\1:r. Spencer for perjury."
Q. Yes; and what else~
A. And :Mr. Haa~, who was present in the
courtroom161 MR. RAWLINGS: Well now, may I ask a
question on voir din~~

THE COURT: Well, I don't think that I ought
to permit a general scene to develop here.
What people i·n the audience said - I permitted this statement to be concluded as to
what the wife said, but if there is somebody
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else among the spectators by the name of Mr.
Haas~

MR. BUDGE: He was an attorney there in
the case, if Your Honor please. He was an
attorney representing, with Mr. Hanson, Mr.
Spencer. He was interested in taking part in
the proceedings.
THE COURT: Well, I will let him answer.
A. lVIr. Haas jumped to his feet and he said,
''I want to make an objection to the court because I don't feel that the prosecution should
browbeat witnesses in this manner.'' My wife
'vas driving the car on April 21, 1939.
CRORS - EXAMINATION:
By Mr. Rawlings:
Q. Have you driven your car since your
162 license was revoked for drunken driving on
June 14, 1938~

MR. RAWLINGS: ·vVell, now, Your Honor, he
said he didn't drive it on this occasion, and I
don't think we are limited entirely to that occasion, and I think we are entitled to test his
credibility; and if he says no, it's a material
fact that we can probably impeach him on.
MR. BUDGE: It isn't a material fact when
you have limited yourself to the Bill of Particulars as the court has held, to one date, and
you couldn't impeach any witness under those
circumstances.
MR. RA \.VLINGS: And further, it would have
a tendency probably to show, at least in view
of the fact yo1t dramatized what happened in
the courtroom at Bringhurst's court, and ll(wr
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a tendency to assist us _a little here in regard
to what happened there.
THE COURT: Now, the question is as to
whether he drove his car at any time after l\IR. RA \YLIN GS : Since his license was revoked for drunken driving. It is our contention they asked that specific question.
THE COURT: I think I should per1nit you to
have an answer.
163 All right, answer it.
A. Yes.
Q. And was that before April 211
MR. BUDGE~: Object to it, if Your Honor
please, as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, and not cross examination.
THE COURT: I will let him answer.
A. Before April 21.
Q. And what date was it~
:MR. BUDGE: I object to it, if Your Honor
please. Now I should like to say to Your
Honor that here is an endeavor to open up the
very field which Your Honor has ruled upon
cannot be entered into. \V e are not tryting1
this case, any other offense than the one they
charge in the Bill of Particulars.
THE COURT: Of course, the contention of
the State here is that one question and one answer was made, and the contention of the defendant is that another question and. another
answer was made. Now I take it that this goes
to your contention that the first question and
answer wen~ made~
MR. RA WLTNGS: Yes, and further than that.
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this courtroom that this man drove his car on
the 21st day of April of this year, and it certainly goes to show that; and it can be considered as logical by this jury that if he drove
a car the day or two before this or a month
before he probably would do as our witnesses
said he did and drove it on this day in violation
of the law.
MR. BUDGE: I say that doesn't follow at all.
MR. RAWLINGS: It is the most logical inference you can draw from the conduct.
164 MR. BUDGE: It may be counsel's inference,
but it isn't logical and we are not being tried
here except for the offense charged in the Infonnation and according to the Bill of Particulars. Now, Your Honor has ruled on that. If
we're going into the question of all other dates
which Your Honor says cannot be gone into,
and we haven't asked him about any other:
THE COURT: I wouldn't permit the State to
offer any other dates than the one or, if they
could, to prove any other dates than the one
which they had stated in the Bill of Particulars,
but this seems to the court to be a different
~ituation than that. This defendant is here now
before the court on cross examination, and the
State has and the defendant and everybody
have always had wide latitude in cross examination. Now the State is, as I unerstand them,
seeking to est,ablish bu cross examination the
inference to the jury that - or the co~clusion,
whatever you might have in your minds ......-- that
the question which they say was asked and the
answer which they say was given was the
question and answer given.
MR. RAWLINGS: Yes, and further than that,
may I suggest that I have a rig·ht to go into
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this line of examination to prove that what our;
'witnesses said was true and what he said was
untrue about him driving on the 21st, by testing his credibility and by calling attention to
the actions which he now admits
THE COURT: I think I ought to permit this
on cross examination, even though I wouldn't
permit it on direct examination or on affimative proof of the State
165 Q.

Now, how many times -

~IR.

BUDGE: Just a moment

166 THE COURT: I don't think the court is pre-

pared at this time to say to the jury you may
consider this £or one purpose and one pur-i
pose only. I think we'll hear the examination
and the court will pass on the questions as they
come; and if, when we get the whole picture
before us, the cross examination, you think it
ought to be limited to something, then I will
hear you.
·

Q. You knew that when you drove your car
when your license was revoked that you wer~
doing it in violation of the law, didn't you~

MR. BUDGE: Object to that as immaterial,
irrelevant and incompetent, and not cross examination and tending to prove a crime not
charg·ed in the Information.
THE COURT: I think I ought to permit the
answer.

Q. You knew that, didn't yon?
A. I did.
Q. How many times did you drive your car
in
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:MR. BUDGE: Same objection.
Realizing that you were driving it in contradiction to the law prior to April 21, 1939 i

Q.

MR. BUDGE: Same objection, Your Honor to
the proposition '
MR. RkWLIN GS: There may be some ques·
tion about that
167 MR. BUDGE: Immaterial
How many times did you drive it prior to
April 21, 1938 ~

Q.

1\iR. BUDGE: Same objection_

Q. 1939?
THE COURT: I will overrule the objection.
A. I recollect two occasions : My wife wa~
with me on one occasion.

Q. Now I will ask YOlJ. to state, l\Ir. Spencer,
whether you drove your car between April 21, •
when you were arrested, and May 31, when yon
testified.
MR. BUDGFJ: Object to that, if Your Honor
please, upon the Harne ground that we insisted
when we urged the question about the Bill of
Particulars. It's an attempt to prove what the
Court has already held is immaterial.
MR. RAWLINGS : No, it isn't.
THE COURT: I thinl\: it's admissible for other
reasons than the ones that the court passed up·
on in the plaintiff's application, the State's
application. I will overrule the objection.
A.

No.
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Q. Now, ~Ir. Spencer, your license was taken
away from you for the reason that you had
been convicted of driving a car while under the
influence of liquor, hadn't itt
~IH. BUDGE: Object to that upon the ground
it's imn1aterial and attempt of counsel to prejudice the defendant. It's a matter that has
been before the court, reiteration of conditions, unnecessary and improper.

168 THE COURT: Objection is overruled.

Q. That's true, isn't
That's true.

it~

A.

Q. And yott realized on the 21st of April and
at the time that you drove your car as you say
prior to that time, you realized your license had
been revoked for that reason?
A. I don't intend to answer that question.
Q.
A.

Oh, you don't?
On the 21st of April I never drove any

car.

Q. Well, l didn't mean to trick you. I wottld
be unable to if I did, the experience you have
had on the witness stand, and I say sincerely
that I didn't mean to trick you.
A. You 'lcould.
1G9 I admit that prior to April 21st I had driven

the car on a couple of occasions in an emergency. My wife was in the car with me on
April 21st, 1939 at the intersection of Maple
Avenue and Highland Drive. The car turned
into ~faple Avenue at Highland Drive on that
day.
170 Q.

And did you see the blockade on Highland
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Drive on that occasion when you turned in
there or when the car turned in~
1\IR. BUDGE: I object to all this as immaterial,
not cross examination. Doesn't tend to prove
anything in this case.
MR, RAWLINGS: It tends to disprove something.
THE COUR~: I will let him answer it.

A. I saw a number of cars. I didn't know
what it was. I wasn't surprised when the car
turned in there. We were going no place in
particular, just driving. We 4ad been out for
171 some plants and there are a number of places
on Highland Drive where you can purclms;e
plants. \Ve did not buy any on Highland
Drive. We were riding around looking over
plants and deciding what we would rather have
i72 to put in the rock garden. I wasn't sure
whether we could buy some plants on Maple
Avenue. I have never been on l\faple Avenue
before that I remember of.
Q. And your wife mobile license at that

did she have an autotime~

MR. BUDGE: Object to it7 if Your Honor
please, as immaterial, not cross examination.
THE COURT: He may answer.
A. My wife has never had a driver's license
to my knowledge. I was with her when the car
was s.tarted from home. We had gone up over
the boulevard down into Holladay looking for
173 plants. I do not know how far. When I
approached Maple Avenue, I noticed a number
of cars, but I didn't know what they were.
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There was nothing that eame into my mind
that I remember.
17 4 If anyone was hurt, I probably would be interested, if I could help in any way. I have never
seen a blockade in my life and have never had
my car stopped for examination by an officer.
I saw cars stopped on both sides of the street
and then the car turned in ~laple Avenue. I
do not know whether the car came to a stop or
not, but it was slowing down. \V e were some
distance back of the last car that was s,top;pea
on Highland Drive. I don't know just what
distance.
175 I wouldn't remember ·what I was thinking
about. I was not concerned about leaving the
176 main highway. \Ye went east. Its always my
wife that is driving with me. I did not give
any particular thought to whether or not the
car slowed_ up, maybe to stop and then turned
into l\!aple Av-Pnue. It's a long time ago and
I do not remember. 1\[y memory is not vague.
I said that my car went east on Maple A venue.
At the time I might have been concerned, but
at this time I do not remember that particular.

177 Q. I think you were concerned. You say you
may have been, and I think that is true. Now,
if you may have been concerned, what were you
concerned about~
i\fR. BUDGE: Just a moment, I object to coun-

sel's arguing with the witness, stating what he
believes; improper cross examination.

MR.

RA\VLI~GS:

I am not f'tating what he

believes.
rri-IE ( jOUR1,: I will ]Pt thr "Titnefs
th0 question.

an.sw~r
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178 I remember testifying in the preliminary
hearing, but I do not remember everything I
testified to. I did testify in regards to the
matter of the car turning into this avenue. I
179 m~ght have testified that the car was turned
into Maple Avenue because of some reason that
pertained to my wife, but I do not remember.
It is a long time ago, but I do remember the
question that was put to me by Mr. Neeley. I
remember testifying in the case in J udgo
Bringhurst's court that my wife was very ex180 cited or hysterical and that my wife was not
used to driving and became excited when she saw
181 thP ears stopped there and that was the reason,
I think, that she turned up into the court.
That is the way I recollect my testimony.
Yes; and before that I had asked you morr
than once hadn't I, here in this court, if there
was any ;eason why you turned in and you said
you didn't even give it a thoughU
A. I didn't remember.
Q. Yes. All right 1\iR. BUDGE: Just a minute.
182 MR. RA"'\VLINGS : He is taking care of hjm ·
self.
Q. Now, Mr. Spencer Q.

:MR. BUDGE:

Just a minute. There is a
rule. May I not make an objection 'l
MR. RAWLINGS: Certainly.
MR. BUDGE: Then let me.
MR. RAWLINGS: Proper thing to do is ask
for it to be striken.
].{R. BUDGE : I want to make a motion if
counsel will just give me an opportunity. I
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object to counsel arg11ing ·with the witness. He
has repeatedly argued "·ith hin1, and it's not
a proper way of examination, and I object to
it as prejudicial.
THE COURT: Well, there is no question now
before the court. Your objection is to what
has taken place in the past, but there isn't anything now.
183 I met Mr. Jensen for the first time that day.
He is the man that testified that he arrested
me on the- 21st day of April and took me to
.Judge Bringhurst's court. My business is that
of an investigator. I also teach and do athletic
work and referee basketball games and other
activities.
Q. Now, Mr. Spencer, you say that or you
said in this court that ·when Neeley said to the
judge, ''I want a complaint for perjury,'' Haas
jumped up and said, "I want to make an objection to the court as I don't feel the court
should browbeat a witness in this case~''
l\IR. BUDGE: He didn't make that statement.

MR. RA\VLINGS: N ow1 I would appreciate it
if you would keep your remarks to yourself.
This witness can take care of himself.
l\IR. BUDGE: I am going to make my-

MR. RA\Vl.JINGS: I wrmt to call attention to
the fact that Mr. Budge a~tdibly, so .l could hear
it and certainly so tl1e jury could hear it and
so the witness could hear it: said •· No, he didn't
mnke such a statement." N ou·, this witness is
perfectly capable of taking care of himself;
and if there is any question about it, l a1n goin.rJ to ask an adjournment now and have the
184
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MR. BUDGE: I object to this statement, if
Your Honor please, to this question upon the
ground that counsel has stated something that
this witness did not testify to; and that the
question is improper for that reason because
the record will show that the witness did not
make that statement. Now, that's my objection to that question.
MR. RAWLINGS: I may be incorrect, but .I
wrote it down as I heard it, and in order that
there might be - Your Honor, I would like an
oppgrtunity if I could until 2:00 o'clock to get
that record out.
THE COURT : Let me hear the question, and
I think I can decide right now whether it's
proper.
THE COURT: That the court should browbeat the witness 1
MR. RAWLINGS: Yes.
MR. BUDGE: Yes.
THE COURT: I will sustain that.
MR. RAWLINGS: Well, Your Honor, I wonder if I could appeal to the record on that?
THE COURT : .I will let you appeal to the
record on it. I thoug-ht that that wasn't exactly what the witness said.
MR. RA·WLINGS: It may not be, and I may
have written it down incorrectly. If I _did, then
I won't pursue it. If I didn't, I would like to
ask that question of this witness after the noon
recess.
185 MR. RAWLINGS: Your Honor, during the
recess I checked with the record, .arnd I found
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out that r our Honor was correct and also
counsel; so I apologize.

186 Mr. Haas was associated with ~lr. Haneon.
l\lr. Hanson '"as my attorney, but I had nothing
to do with :Mr. Haas. He participated in the
case as an associate of Mr. Hanson. I recognized :Jlr. Hanson as my attorney and I suppose I recognized ~Ir. Haas as my attorney.
He was there assisting ~Ir. Hanson. He jumped
up and said in substance or effect that he
wanted to object to the prosecution browbeating witnesses. He made an objection to the
court and said ''I don't feel that the prosecution should be permitted to browbeat the witnesses.''
188 Mr. Haas may have made objections or statements to Judge Bringhurst other than the ones
I have indicated during the trial, but I do not
remember them and to the best of my judgment
I would say that he made no other statement.
189 Neeley had said something about perjury and
that was immediately after he had made theremark and immediately after I had made my
answer, but Haas, before that, had jtunped up
and said, ''You can't browbeat our witnesses.''
Just about the time this was going on, there
was a turmoil in the court and Mr. Neeley was
waving his hands and throwing his hands in
the air and Haas at that time intervened and
said "I make an objection here to the court - "
"That the proRecution shouldn't be permitted
to browbeat and intimidate tlw witnesses.'' I
190 do not remember just exar.tly what he was saying. Everything was all in a turmoil down
there and he had alreadv made the statement
had
heFunding
en seen
on.provided
two byoecasi
ons
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your car since your were arrested.'' And also
that, ''I want a complaint for perjury against
this man.'' That was all right in tfiere and Mr.
Haas at that ti1ne intervened and made this ob191 jection. When perjury was mentioned, I had
nothing to say.
Q. If you had been innocent you would have
said, "Go ahead and try it, Brother."

A. I don't conduct myself maybe like you do.
I had nothing to say, either then or after. As
far as Mr. Neeley was concerned there was
plenty of confusion. He was plenty angry. l.Ir.
192 Hanson said something in the turmoil, but I do
not recall what he said. The judge sat there,
didn't say very much of anything. He was so
taken off his feet that he couldn't say anything.
Just a moment, Spencer. You know
to know to answer questions when I ask
them, not to volunteer statements. I didn't
ask what the judge was doing. I didn't ask
whether the judge had been taken off his feet.
I asked you what the judge said. Now answer.
Q.

eno~gh

MR. BUDGE: I object to counsel's attitude,
yelling at the witness, and getting all het up
and getting his blood pressure up to 210, when
there is no occasion for it.
MR. RAWLINGS: Yon aet kind of funny at
times.
MR. BUDGE: I am not trying to act funny,
but your counsel's conduct is ammdng.
193 MR. RA·WLINGS: I am sorry if I upset you.
MR. BUDGE: You don't upset me.
afraid you will break a blood vessel.

I am
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Q. \Yell, then, you don't usually tell the
truth?
A. I tell the truth a whole lot better than
you do.
Q. \Yell, now, you say your blood pressure is
up, what is causing it?
~\. There may be two or three things. You
are one of them, and a frame-up in this case is
another, and you're back of it, if you want to
know the reason.

Q. All right, now, I demand that you tell
about that frmne-up; I want you to tell the jury
about the frame-up; and you not only can tell
positive evidence but auy evidence that's hearsay which you think indicates ,a frame-up, and
I want ym!J to tell them and I demand it.
MR. BUDGE: If Your Honor please, I object.
MR. RAWLINGS: No, I think you're getting
high blood pressure.
MR. BUDGE: Counsel is very much excited.
Counsel let himself into this thing and he asked
for what he got, and its immaterial what he
asked this witness to relate. It isn't cross examination. I object to it.
MR. R~WLINGS: Your Honor, I think I have
some standing in this court.
THE COURT: I don't think it's a matter to
which you can object. I think counsel is entitled to have his answer.
194 The frame-up that I mentioned was down in

Judge Bringhurst's court around the 19th of
l\[ay, ~ometime before the 31st. ~lr. Hanson
was my attorney and we went down and the
State
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dence was put on Mr. Hanson said, ''We don't
care to produce any evidence. \V e 'll stand on
the record.'' And the judge said, ''I will take
the case under advisement at this time.'' He
said, ''I won't pass any judgment on it,'' so
the case was taken under advisement. In a
few days Judge Bringhurst called Mr. Hanson
and he said, ".Mr. Hanson, I am not entirely
satisfied - "
Q. Now, Spencer, I don't want any long dissertation.

MR. BUDGE: You said he could relate hearsay. Go ahead.

Q. So far as it pertains to me, but I expect
you to tie me into this thing.
A. You are in the District Attorney's, office.
You also have something to do with the County
Attorney.
195 Q.

Nothing at all.

THE COURT: Now, just a moment. The court
is permitting this to go on because it felt a personal insiwuation or statement had been made
against a member of the bar, but I am not going to permit any statement relative to these
matters that doesn't substantiate the declaration which you made and which the District
Attorney demanded an airing of. Now, anything that the Judge said or that the County
Attorney said or did or anybody else, that
doe-sn't have some relation to the District
Attorney, just don't repeat it.
A. Then I will say right now, Your Honor,
that if Mr. ;Rawlings hasn't anything to do
with the County Attorney's office - my understanding was that he did because he is trying
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this case - and that .Judg·e Bring-hurst works
under the County ..:-\.ttorney. That's my under·
standing-, and I made that staten1ent because
there was a statement made to me, a s.tatement
made to ~Ir. Hanson and alsoQ. Just a minute, Spencer.
A. A statement nmde to 1ne.

Q. Just a minute. I asked you about your
blood pressure and you said it was up because
of me and because I was in the frame-up. Now
you tell that jury how I was in the frame-up.
A. I am telling it.
Q. All right, the judge has told you it doesn't
make any difference wlzat Bringhurst said.
A. May I tell them?
Q. The judge says it doesn't make any difference what Bringhurst or your attorney said.
You can tell them anything that pertains to
me.
L96 A. That is exactly what I want to do.

Q. Confine your remarks to that.
A. I don't want to say anything that ~rou are
not deserving, Mr. Rawlings, and if you
aren't in on it, I will apolog·ize.
Q. You had better.
A. And if there is anything else I am going to
be held for in that statement I made, I am willing to stand for whatever is coming to me.
Q. You tell them how I am in this frame-up.
A. That is what I am going to do.

Q. All right.
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Q. I am going to object. As Your Honor has
indicated, it is immaterial, irrelev.ant, what
went on between Hanson and Bringhurst. 1
want you to tell the jury A. This is part of the circumstances that led
up to it.
Q. Tell how I am involved in those circumstances.
A. But there is no sense in my going into it
if I can't lead up to the circumstances that go
into it.
Q. You can tell this jury any circumstances
where I am involved in this creation in your
mind.
A. .I would like to.

MR. BUDGE: Just a moment. If Your Honor
please, I object to this upon this ground: This
witness said what he understood was a frameup and that J\fr. Rawlings was in on it. Now
then counsel won't permit him to state what
he considers to be the frame-up. Now I say
that this is nothing more than just a badger197 ing of the witness. He offered that he was
very willing to let him go into anything, hearsay and everything else, but now he doesn't
want the witness to make any remark except
what concerns him and uses his name.
MR. RA·WLINGS : And anything he may hav'
heard from anybody about me being connected
at aU with this case.
MR. BUDGE: You didn't s.ay that.
THE COURT: I wiii tell you what the court
thinks about this situation. It now a.ppears to
the court that the witness has confessea that
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he doesn't know of any frame-up in which the
District Attorney is involved; that he has
stated that there 1cas no frame-up so far as
the District AttonzezJ is concerned; that he has
indicated substanti~ly that he thinks there
may be some injuries done him by somebody
else; but if the District A_ttorney wasn't involved in that, then he doesn't claim he is involved in this. Now is that about what you
meant

A.

That's it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: \Yell, I think we can pass this
matter then.
:MR. RA\VLINGS: Satisfactory.

A. As far as M.r. Rawlings is concerned
sonally.

per~

199 Q.

You understand the sanctity of the oath.
don't you~
A. I appreciate it very much ~Jr. Rawlings.
and I want you to appreciate the same thing.
~fR.

RAWLINGS: Now, just a minute. I am
not here to be lectured, and I am not on trial.
and I am going to ask the court to instruct thi~
witness to refrain from making his comments
THE COURT: The court ·will have to insist
that we proceed in a little more orderly manner, and just answer the questions as they are
put. You don't need to make any explanations
or any side remarks. If there is anything that
ymtr counsel wants to clear up, he will do that.
If there is anything he doesn't like about the
e'1iamin.ation, he'll make his record on it and
make his objections to the rourt. \Ye'll stop
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all of this discussion and just have questions
and answers.
Q. Now, Mr. Spencer, do you remember anything else being said during this turmoil excepting what you have given us, by anyone?
A. I don't recollect any other right now, Mr.
Rawlings.
Q. Do you remember anything else being said
in the trial by any witness that you haven't
given us, any testimony Y
200 A. Glenn Hastings Q. Outside of your own witness t
A. Outside of any other wiinesses!
Q. Yes.
A. I remember pretty well what happened in
each instance, yes sir.
1\fr. Jensen was the first witness that testified
on behalf of the State and I remember the sub·
stance of his testimony.
Q. Do you recall any words that he gave.
A. Yes, I can almost tell you word for word
his testimony, if I were permitted to tell what
Mr. Jensen told in that court down there.
Q. Now, just a minute Mr. Spencer, kindly
remember the admonition of the court. Don't
get too anxio1~rs. Now I will ask you, Mr.
Spencer, whether or not after Mr. Jensen
arrested you he took you to Bringhurst's
court.
A. He did.
201 I ,gave the name of my brother, Lolo. Bringhurst and Jensen were present. Bringhurst
asked me my name. I gave him an address on
Fifth East and later Jensen spoke up and said
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

63
that my name was Sidney Spencer and I said
that's right, my name is Sidney Spencer and
then I gave my own address.
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION:
By :.Mr. Budge:
202 I said that I had used the car on two occasions
after my license was revoked and before the
21st of April, 1939. On one occasion my wife
had been informed by her mother, who lives
in Boise, Idaho, that her boy was dying in
California. She came down on the train to
Salt Lake City. The boy was working on the
WPA. She c~me to Salt Lake and I drove the
(jar to California. I met her at the train. On
203 the other occasion, I think it was when my boy
was ill, and I liad to go ·down to the drugstore
to get some paregoric or something to relieve
him. I had no driver at that time and I jumped
204 into the car and went. I never knew Sergeant
:McDonald's name until after I was -arrested.
I did not say to Sergeant McDonald, at the
time in substance or effect, ''For Hell's sake,
205 Mac, give me a break.''
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION:
By Mr. Rawlings:

Q. Now, ;Mr. Spencer, you said you were an
investigator, and I assume you have invP-stigated numerous automobile accidents, haven't
you~

MR. BUDGE: Object to this as not re-cross
206 examination.
THE COURT: He may answer the question.
207 I investigate automobile accidents for myself
and for anyone that chooses to use n1e for that
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purpose. In some cases the State Road Patrolmen might have been the only witnesses in the
case, but that I do not know. If I were investigating, it would be a part of my work to
know who had been there at and after the
scene of the accident. I never contacted Ser.
geant McDonald on any of my investigations.
If I have ever talked -~.rith him at all it was on
the telephone and I didn't know who I was
talking to. I have never called for l\:fcDonald.
208 I have talked to him sinee this case. I have
handled thousand:;; of cases just like you have.

Q. Oh, no, not just like I have, I~hope.
A. Some of them. If within the last five
years, I have ever talked to McDonald personally, I did not know that his ·name was McDonald. That is all I can say, Mr. Rawlings.
Q. Just a minute, Mr. Spencer. The a.rg1tment we will expect your counsel to take care
of. Just leave the .argument out. I asked you
if you had ever in the last five years. talked to
209 Sergeant McDonald in the State Road Patrol.
212 I don't remember that I have. I have never
taken a trip to Kemmerer, Wyoming. I have
never seen the city of Kemmerer in my life.
Q. You have told us that?
A.. That's my brother again, I think.
Q. You know a lot about your brother, don't
you~

A.. I hope so. He's a peach of a brother.
Q. Yes, I know.
213 I know Lote Kinney very well. I did not state
to Lote Kinney about a month ago in Salt Lake
City that I had just returned from Kemmerer,
Wyoming.
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)LRS. ~~XKIE D. CLAYTON, a witness calleu
on behalf of the defendant, testified substantially as follo"-s :

DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Budge:
214 I reside at 1750 Maple AYenue in Salt Lake
County, and re~ided there on the 21st day of
April, 1939. :Jly residence is on the south side
of )laple Avenue, about two blocks from High215 land Dri...-e and at the end of .Maple Avenue.
About five o'clock in the afternoon of April
21st, I was across the road north. It is just
a narrow street. I sa\\- a car driving up Maple
AYenue, east with a patrolman car following
it, and the car ahead stopped in my yard. I
216 saw )!r. Spencer step out of the car just as
soon as it stopped. He got out from t.he
right-hand side of the car.
CROSS - FJX.AMINArriON:
By Mr. Rawlings:
217 The car stopped where the bridge is in my
back yard, facing south. After Mr. Spencer
left, the car remained in the yard. I drove
the car away with 1Irs. Spencer and I took
her home.
RT~-DIRECT

EXAMINATION:
By Mr. Budge:
I was not acquainted ·with the Spencers prior
to April 21st and had never known them before. ~[rs. Spencer was nervous and upset.
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION:
By ~ir. Rawlings:
218 I han~ talked to Mr. and Mrs. Spencer since
this case came up. I do not recall disc1..~ssin(~·
tltP
rase nny rnore than I have already stated.
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I do not remember that they asked n1e or toltl
me what I had seen.

vVILLARD HANSON, a witness called on behalf of the defendant, testified substantially as follows :

DIRECrr EXAMINATION:
By Mr. Budge:
219 I am sixty-fiv:e years of age and am practicing
law. I know the defendant, Sid Spencer, and
have known him by sight for a few years. I
have known him since last December when I
became well acquainted with him. I employed
him at the t~me to get some evidence in some
bus cases here and since then in another case.
I have known him well enough since last December to do business with him, but not before
that. I represented him in two hearings before
Judge Bringhurst. The first was on J\fay 19th
and then the case \Vn.s reopened and on the
31s.t we had another hearing. On the 31st, 1
recall a witness by the name of Glenn Hastings
being called to the stand and I remember the
questions and answers.
220 After a few preliminary questions, I asked Mr.
Hastings if he had been driving the car for
Mr. Spencer since a certain time and he said
he had. As I recall, I asked him if he had
either been driving all the time since Mr.
Spencer's license had been revoked or else I
said from June of last year, I think, one or the
other at that period. Over the period anyway
that the lice-nse had lwcn revoked.
221 After he had answered that question, I asked
him if to his knowledge J\fr. Spencer had driven
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the car since his license \nls revoked and then
.Mr. Neeley, the assistant county attorney, who
was prosecuting the case, objected and stated
to the court that we were only trying ~.Lr.
Spencer for driving on the 21st of April o.f this
year and objected to his answering of the
question and anything that had occurred hefore that or after that was wholly irrelevant
and immaterial and the judge sustained the
objection and 1\Ir. Hastings was excused fron1
the wi.tne::;s stand and left the court room.
222 .Jir. Spencer was the next witness called after
Mr. Hasting·s. I recall that Mr. Neeley propounded to ~Ir. Spencer a question with respect to driving the car. Mr. Neeley said to
Mr. Spencer, ''Haven't you been driving your
car since you were arrested for driving without a license~''. And Mr. Spencer s.aid, ·'No,
sir." And then Mr. Neeley seemed to get quite
angry and jumped up and said in a rather
angry tone and pointing his finger at Spencer,
''Why, we have witnesses that you have driven
two or three times since you were arrested for
driving since your license had been revoked or
since this ar:rest.'' And Mrs. Spencer jumped
up and said, q,Why, :Jfr. Neeley, that is not so.
He hasn't even back0d it out of the driveway."
And Neeley said, "\Vell, I '1n going to have this
man arrested for perjury."
223 And Mr. Haas, who was one of the attorneys
in the case, got up and said, ''I want to make
an objection here to the prosecution trying to
intimidate the defendant's witnesses.'' l\fr.
Neeley said that he wasn't trying to intimidate
anybody but that he was going to have Mr.
Spencer arrested for perjury. }Jr. Neeley on
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that occasion did not ask Mr. Spencer in substance or effect, ''Have you at any time driven
your car since your license was revoked~''
CROSS -EXAMINATION:
By Mr. Rawlings:
224 The hearing after May 19th was at my request.
We requested that the case be reopened so that
we could put in our defense after the judge had
telephoned me. We stipulated with the county
attorney that it could be reopened and it was
reopen_ed. I mn still representing Mr. Spencer
as counsel in the misdemeanor case : the case
before Judge Bringhurst.
'

225

JOSEPH R. HAAS, a witness called on behalf of the defendant, testified substantially as follows~
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Budge:

226 I am an attorney at law and ljve in Salt Lake
City. I was one df the counsel in the case in
Judge Bringhurst's court wherein the defendant, Sid Spencer, was charged with driving his
automobile without a driver's license. Mr.
Hanson was the counsel. I was in :Mr. Hanson's office and I went do'"~ with him at his
request on both occasions. I was present when
Mr. Hastings was called as a witness,. Mr.
Hastings was asked a que8tion by Mr. Hanson
with respect to ~pencer driving the car and
while I do not pretend to give the exact wordR
it was substantially as follows:
"At any time since you have been

driv~
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ing for ~Ir. Spencer has l\[r. Spencer driven
his car'?''
2:27 .Jlr. Hanson asked the witness how long he had
been dridng for Mr. Spencer and I think he
said, "Ever since l\fr. Spencer's license wa.s
revoked.'' Then .Jir. Neeley jumped to his feet
and objected on the ground that nobody was
concerned and said, "\Ye are not concerned
with anything that happened prior to April
21st.'' Then the judge sustained the objection.
I think that this was the end of Hasting~ '
testimony.
228 Spencer was called to the stand in his own behalf. He followed l\Ir. Hastings. On cross examination :Mr. Keeley did not ask ~Ir. Spencer
in substance or effect "Have you driven your
car at any time since your license was revoked~'' As well as I can remember the words
that Neeley used were, "Have you driven your
car at any time since you were arrested for
this
I
. offense with which you are charged~''
'\
think he referred to the date. Spencer's an"
swer was ''no.'' Neeley th~n got to his feet
and said, ''Now, Sid, I am going to charge you
with perjury, becaus~ we have proof that at
least on two occasions since you were arrested
you have driven ~~onr car. Mrs. Spencer was'
seated a little bit north in the same room. ShP.
got up and said,
220

"Why, 1\f r. Spencer h~s n~ver backe__d his
car out of the yard or the driveway since
he \Vas arrested.''

A little before this l\fr. Neeley had shaken hiB
fin.!ter at :\f r. Spencer and I got up and said
that I thoug-ht it was improper to intimidate
a
witnr~s or something to that pffcct.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

70

CROSS - EXAMINATION:
By Mr. Rawlings:
230 In a way there was an altercation when Neeley
juraped to his feet and objected to ·the question
asked Mr. Hastings and it. wasn't a settled
question after the Justice of the Peace had
sustained the objection. Nevertheless, Mr.
Hanson abided by the ruling of the court. I
do not remember the details of Mr. Hastings'
testimony because- after he had been asked the
preliminary question the only pertinent question remaining he wasn't allowed to answer.
232 The question asked l\Ir. Hastings by Mr. Hanson was, "At any time since you have been
employed by Mr. Spencer, has Mr. Spencer
driven his car 1" At least that is the subs,tance
of the question. He might have said, ''To your
knowledge.'' I could not say.
233 That is what I refer to as a pertinent question
and Neeley objected to it on the ground that
the only date that he was interested in was
April 21, 1939. He said that nothing prior to
that would have any effect at all. Then Neeley
asked the question of Spencer as to whether
or not he had driven the car since April 2~,
1939. I do not know his e-xact words. I did
not go to Bringhurst's court for any particular
purpose. I have been in l\tfr. Hanson's office
for about three and one-half years and have
been employed py him on various occasions to
assist and to handle matters separately, out I
am not employed hy him except on occasions.
234 The day when the State's evidence was put in,
he said, "Come on and ride down with me."
About a week or two later, he asked if I would
ride down with him. The only part I took in
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the case was when I said something about intimidating the witness. I was assisting Mr.
Hanson in any n1anner that I could. I have
frequently been requested by Mr. Hanson to
accompany him and have taken part in cases
that have co1ne on for trial and in which I was
not e1nployed.

235

GLENN HASTINGS, a witness called on behalf of the defendant, testified substantially as follows :

DIREC'l' EXAMJNATION
By Mr. Budge:
236 I am thirty-eight years of age. I was present
in Judge Bringhurst's court on the 31st of ~fay,
1939 in the case in which Mr. Spencer was
charged with driving an automobile without a
driver's license. At that 1ime I was interrogated by Willard Hanson. He asked me if
to my knowledge :Mr. Spencer had driven his
car at any time since his license was revoked,
and I did not answer. Then Mr. Neeley jumped
up and objected to the question, said it had
nothing whatever to clo with the case. ·rhe
court sustained the objection.
CROSS - EXAMINATION:
By l\fr. Rawlings:
?:37 I have talk(\d this matter over with Mr. Spencer. I am livjng at his house. ~r rs. Spencer is
my ~ister. I have not discussed with Mr.
Spencer what I was going to testify about.
l\r r. Rpencer asked me to come to court to testify. Mr. Hanson has asked me a few preliminary
questions
likewise
Spencer.
The
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questions asked were the ones that 1\tlr. Bu
just asked me.
2:~~

As I recall it, Mr. Neeley, in Bringhur
court, said: "That's imm~terial to this c:
I am not interested in anything that happe
prior to April 21st.'' My occupation is tha1
a glazier, but I have not worked since A]
240 of 1938. Since tha,t time I have been liv
with Mr. Spencer who furnishes me bo~
room and clothing.

MRS. SID SPENCER, a witness called on
half of the defendant, testified subst
tially as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION:
By ~1r. Budge:
I am the wife of the defendant. l was pres
in Judge Bringhurst's. court on the 31st
May, 1939 in the case where my husband 1
the defenrlant. I heard the question that 1
propounder by Mr. Neeley to my husband:
also the question propounded by ~[r. Han
to my brother, Mr. Hastings. ~Ir. Han
asked Mr. Hastings, ''To your knowledge,
any time since l\fr. Spencer's license was
voked has he driven his car~'' The quest
' answered because ~Ir. Neeley obJeC
.
was not
to it.

241 On cross examination Mr. Neeley asked
huB>band, '' 1\t[r. Spencer, have you driven y
car at any time since you were arrested
driving the car without a driver's licensE
~fr. Neeley did not ask my husband if he ·
driven a car since his license was revol
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\\l1en :Jir. Neeley asked the question that I
haYe first mentioned, Mr. Spencer answered
"no." ~Ir. Neeley became very angry, jumped
up fron1 the table and said, ''Sid, you have
been seen driving your car on two occasions.''
I then becarne ang·ry and jumped up from my
chair and said.
''l\Ir. Keeley, that is not true. Sid has not
backed his car out of the drive·way since
his arrest.''
2±2 Mr. Neeley then turned to Judge Bringhurst
and asked for a complaint against me for admitting driving the car without a license and
also told Sid that he was going to get him for
perjury. There was a complaint filed a&ainst
me.
Q. I show you, 1Irs. Spencer, the Defendant's
Exhibit 2, so marked for identification, and
ask you if that is the- document or summon5:
which was served on you in this case which
was filed against you~
A. It is.
~1:R. BUDGE: We offer this in evidence.
MR. RAWLINGS: Object on the ground it's
immaterial, irrelevant; has no bearing on thP.
issues of the case.
243 THE COURT: I will sustain the objection.
I was driving the car on the 21st day of April,
1939 on Highland Drive near 1faple Avenue.
I drove the car up to the home of Mrs. Clayton.
when the officer was follwing me.

CRORS- EXAMINATION:
By Mr. Rawlings:
244 The reason that I can recall word for word
what was said in the courtroom was because of
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the attitude of the attorney and the attitude
246 of the judge. I think that we left home after I

fed the baby. I usually feed the baby between
twelve or one o'clock. I drove the car out of
the yard. It was a lovely day. I drove out to
Dave Keith's and we dropped in th~.re a few
minutes. I went there to look for some plants.
We then stopped at the Woolley's.
247 I am not a very good driver. I haven't tried to
drive very ofiten. I had not applied for a
248 driver's license because I didn't feel that I
could drive the car well enough. This was not,
however, the firs,t time that I had driven the
car. On this particular day, I wanted to takn
the car and I told Sid if he wouldn't go with
me that I would go without him. My brother·
was not home that day.
1

261

VERN RASMUSSEN, a witness called on behalf of the defendant, testified suhstantia.Ily as follows·
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By Mr. Budge:

262 I am a salesman, thirty-seven years old and
live in Salt Lake City. I am well acquainted
with Sid K. Spencer and his wife, and have
been for approximately twelve years. On thP.
21st of April, 1939 I was driving at a point
where Murphy Lane enters Highland Drive.
Murphy Lane is about two blocks , south :oii
Maple Avenue and on the west side of the
street. I entered Highland Drive on Murphy
Lane. There is a stop sign there and I stopped
for it. I noticed a blockade on Highland Drive
north of Maple Av-enue. I saw Mr. Spencer's
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car. It was dridng north on Highland Drive
as I stopped at the stop sign on Murphy Lane.
Sid and his wife were in the car. Mrs. Spencer
was driving.
CROSS - EXA~IINATION:
By ~fr. Rawlings:
263 I have seen Mrs. Spencer driving the car
several times before. I kne·w the car very well
and I knew the people in it. I remember tes264 tifying in Judge Bringhurst's. court about this
matter. · The Spencers .and myself visit to265 gether occasionally. In the hearing in Judge
266 Bringhurst's court I did not testify that the
Spencer car was going south when I saw iL
Whereupon the defendant rested.

J. PATTON NEELEY was recalled as a witness on behalf of the State in rebuttal and
testified substantially as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By :Mr. Rawlings:
267 I was present in Judge Bringhurst 'H court
when Mr. Spencer was being tried on the
charge of having driven his automobile after
his license had been revoked. I remember ~Ir.
Rasmussen testifying. He testified that he saw
the Spencer car driving south on Highland
Drive.
269 Whereupon, both sides rested.

Incorporated in the Bill of Exceptions is the
defendant's
demand for a bill of particulars,
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the demand being set forth in the Abstract at
page 5.
Incorporated in the Bill of Exceptions is the
bill of particulars furnished by the State, pursuant to the above demand and which bill of
particulars is set forth in the Abstract at
pages 5-6.
270 Incorporated in the Bill of Exceptions is the
defendant's motion to set aside the verdict
and grant a new trial and which notice and
motion and demand is set forth in the Abstract
at pages 17-18.
That by orders duly made and entered and
within time, the time for the preparation~
service and filing of the Bill of Exceptions
herein was extended, to and including the lOth
day of F·ebruary, 1940.
TENDER OF BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.
('l'ITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE).
271 On the 16th day of January, 1940 comes Sid
K. Spencer, the defendant above named, and
serves upon Calvin W. Rawlings, District Attorney, Third Judicial District Court, State of
Utah, the attorney for the plaintiff above
named, the foregoing Bill of Exceptions for
use on appeal herein consisting of one volume
of 217 pages, numbered from 1 to 217, together
with Exhibits A and 1, which were introduced
in the case and are made a part hereof by
r~ference thereto. The san1e is hereby tendered
to and served upon counsel for the plaintiff as
aforesaid that he mav examine the same and
propose any amend~ents thereto ·which he
shall be advised ought to he made in order that
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the said Bill of Exceptions be settled and
as a full, true and correct Bill of Exceptions.
JESSE H. BUDGE,
HARLEY \V. GUSTIN,
Attorneys for Defendant.
allow~d

Service of the foregoing proposed Bill of Exceptions acknowledged this 16th day of Jannary, 1940.
CALVIN ·\V. RAWLINGS,
District Attorney, Third Judicial District Court, State of
Utah,
Attorney for Plaintiff.
STIPULATIOX TO SETTLE BILL OF
EXCEPTIONS
t'flTLE OF COURT AND CAUSE).

The undersigned, couns.el for the plaintiff
herein, hereby stipulates and agrees that he
has examined the foregoing Bill of Exceptions
in the above entitled cause of action; that he
has no amendments to propose- thereto and tha.t
the same may now be- presented to the court
and ~igned, settled and allowed by the judge
who tried said cause, without notice and in
his absence as the full, true and correct Bill
of Exceptions in said cause.
Dated this 23rd dav
. of January. ' 1940.

·~

CALVIN W. RAWLINGS,
District Attorney, Third Judirial District Court, State of
Utah,
Attorney for Plaintiff.
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CERTIFICATE OF JUDGE SETTLING
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS
(TrrLE OF COURT AND CAUSE).
272 I, Oscar W. McConkie, the District Judge who
tried the foregoing cause, do hereby certify
that the above and foregoing Bill of Exceptions consisting of 217 pages, numbered from
1 to 217, inclusive, contains all of the testimony and evidence offered, admitted or
adduced upon the trial of said cause, together
with all objections and exceptions. taken and
motions made, and all proceedings had on the
trial, before and after judgment, in said cause
and not otherwise of record; and contains sufficient reference to all exhibits therein referred to identify the same. There being no
amendments thereto, said Bill of Exceptions is
hereby approved, settled, signed and allowed
within time as the full, true and correcct Bill
of Exceptions in the foregoing cause of State
of Utah, Plaintiff, v. Sid K. Spencer, Defendant, and the clerk is hereby ordered to file the
same.
Dated this 22rd day of January. 1940.

OSCAR W. McCONKIE, Judge.
Attest:

WILLIMI J. KORTH,
Clerk.
By RICHARD BOHLING,
Deputy Clerk.
Bill of Exceptions filed January 23, 1940.
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ASSIGNM.ENrrs OF ERROR
(TITLE OF COURT AND CAUSE).
Comes now Sid IL Spencer, the defendant and
appellant above named, and assigns the following errors occurring in the trial of this cause
before the Honorable Oscar \Y. McConkie, one
of the judges of the District Court of the Third
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, and which errors he relies upon
for a reversal of the judgment in this cause.

I.
That the information does not state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense. (Tr. 6;
Ab. 1).

IT.
That the court erred in denying defendant's
motion to quash the information. (Tr. 9; Ab.
2).

m.
That the court erred in denying defendant's
motion to dismiss the information. (Tr. 11;
Ab. 4).

IV.
That the court erred in denying defendant's
motion for dismissal at the close of State's
evidence. (Tr. 143-151; Ab. 38).

v.
That the court erred in denying defendant's
motion for a new trial. ( Tr. 44, 4-8; A b. 17).

VI.
That the court erred in refusing to give deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

80
fendant's requested instruction No. 1. (Tr.
35; Ab. 13).
VII.
That the court erred in giving defendant's reques.ted in~truction No. 1 as amended by the
court. (Tr. 35; Ab. 13-14).

VIII.
That the court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction No. 2. (Tr.
36; Ab. 14).

IX.
That the court erred in refusing to gjve defendant's requested instruction No.4. (Tr. 38;
Ab. 15).

X.
That the court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction No.5. (Tr. 39;
Ah. 16).

XI.
That the court erred in denying defendant's
motion to strike the answer of the State's witness Bringhurst on direct examination:
'' Q. When was this Complaint filed 7
A. It was filed on the 21st day of April."
(Tr. 65; Ab. 23).

XII.
That the court erred in admitting in evidence
over defendant's objection State's Exhibit A,
the same being the complaint before Judge
Bringhurst. (Tr. 66; Ab. 23).

XIII.
That the court erred in overruling defendant's
objection to the following question asked th~
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:State's witness Bringhurst on direct examination:

"Q. I will ask you to state whether or not
:Mr. Neeley asked :Mr. Spencer, the defendant in this case, and the defendant in that
case, a question relative to whether or not
he had driven his automobile since his
driver's license had been revoked for
drunken driving." (Tr. 68; .A.b. 24).

XIV.
That the court erred in sustaining the State's
objection to the following quest,ion asked the
State's witness Bringhurst on cross examination:

"Q. Now, isn't it true that after Mr.
Hanson had propounded that question and
you sustained the objection, that the witness was excused~'' ( Tr. 78-79; Ab. 26).
XV.
That the court erred in denying defendant's
motion to strike the following answer of the
State's witness Bringhurst on re-direct examination:

'' Q. And it was dismissed at the request
of the County Attorney, wasn't it~
A. That's right." (Tr. 92; Ab. 29).

XVI.
That the court erred in sustaining the State's
objection to the following question asked the
State's witness Neeley on cross examination:
"Q. Well, now, to refresh your recollection, didn't you then object to that question
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material and that the only thing before the
court was whether or not Mr. Spencer had
driven the car on the 21st of April?'' ( Tr.
98; Ab_ 30).
XVII.
That the court erred in overruling defendant's
objection to the following question asked the
State's witness Jensen on direct examination:

'' Q. ·When you got down to Judge Bringhurst's court, was there any conversation
between the Judge and Spencer and you 2''
(Tr. 114; Ab. 33).

XVIII.
That the court erred in overruling defendant's
objection to the following question and answer of State's witness Jensen on direct examination·
'' Q. Tell us what was said between
Spencer. the Judge and you to the bes~t of
your re~ollection when you got down ther~
A. I went in and told the Judge that I
wanted a complaint and he started to make
it out and he asked Mr. Spencer his naine ''
(Tr. 115; Ab. 33)

XIX.
That the court erred in sustaining the State's
objection to the following question asked the
defendant Spencer on direct examination:

"Q.

Do you recall a question that was
propounded to Mr. Hastings by Willard
Hanson, your counsel, in that case?
A. I do.

What was that question?''
Ab. 38).

(Tr. 152-153;
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XX.
That the court erred in overruling defendant's
objection to the following question asked the
defendant Spencer on cross exrunination:

"Q. Have you dri.ven your car since yonr
license was revoked for drunken driving on
June 1-!, 1938~" (Tr. 161-162; Ab. 44).

XXI.
That the court erred in overruling defendant's
objection to the follo,ving question asked the
defendant Spencer on cross examination:

"Q. And was that before April 21 ~"
( Tr. 163; Ab. 45).

xxn.
That the court erred in overruling defendant's
objection to the following question asked the
defendant Spencer on cros.s examination:
'' Q. You knew that when you drove your
car when your license was revoked that you
were doing it in violation of the law, didn't
you~" {Tr. 166; Ab. 47).

XXIII.
That the court erred in overruling defendant's
objection to the following question asked the
defendant Spencer on cross examination:
'' Q. How many times did you drive it
prior to April 21, 1939~" (Tr. 166-167;
Ab. 48).

XXIV.
That the court erred in overruling defendant's
objection to the following question asked the
defendant Spencer on cross examinatitJn:
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'' Q. Now, I will a.sk you to state, Mr.
Spencer, whether you drove your car between the date of April 21, when you were
arrested, and May 31, when you testified~"
(Tr. 167; Ab. 48).

XXV.
That the court erred in overruling defendant's
objection to the following question ask~d the
defendant Spencer on cross examination;

"Q. Now, Mr. Spencer, your license was
taken away from you for the reason that
you had been convicted of driving a car
while under the influence of liquor, hadn't
iU'' (Tr. 167; Ab. 49).

XXVI.
'fhat the court erred in overruling defendant's
objection to the following question asked the
defendant Spencer on cross examination:
'' Q. And did you see the blockade that .did you see a blockade on Highland Drive
on that occasion when you turned in there
or when the car turned in~" ( Tr. 170:
Ab. 49).

XXVII.
That the court erred in overruling defendant's
objectjon to the following question asked the
defendant Spencer on cross examination:
'' Q. And your wife - did she have an
automobile license at that time~" (Tr.
172; Ab. 50).

XXVIII.
That the court erred in overruling defendant's
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objection to the following question asked the
defendant Spencer on cross exmnn1ation:

· · Q. I think you were concerned. You say
you may lmYe been, and I think that is true.
Now. if :rou may have been concerned.
what were you concerned about1" (Tr.
177; Ab. 51).

XXIX.
That the court erred in overruling defendant's
objection to the following question asked the
defendant Spencer on re-cross examination:

"Q. Now, Mr. Spencer, you said you were
an investigator) and I assume you have
investigated numerous automobilP accidents, haven't you~" (Tr. 205; Ab. 63).

XXX.
That the verdict of the jury is contrary to the
law and to thP evidence. (Tr. 41; Ab. 17).

XXXI.
That the judgment entered on the verdict
contrary to the law and evidence.

IS

XXXII.
That the verdict of the jury and judgment
entered thereon i:-; cont:rary to the evidence and
against law in the following particulars, towit:
(a) That the evidence affirmatively shows
and without contradiction that the purported
answer of the defendant as set· forth in the
information and bill of particular:;; on file herein was not a material, competent or relevant
answer to any proceeding then pending in any
court of competent jurisdiction and was not
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material to any issue in any action in which defendant might have been called as a witness.
(b) That the information on file herein, together with the bill of particulars wholly fails
to disclose, as does the evidence, the question
propounded to defendant, if any, and its competency, relevancy or materiality to any issue
then before any court of con1petent JUrisdiction.
(c) That the evidence affirmatively and without contradiction shows that the defendant.
was not driving thf\ automobile alleged to have
been his on the 21st day of April, 1939 or at
any time subsequent thereto to and including
the 31st day of May, 1939.
(d) That the evidence conclusively Hhows and
without contradiction that if the answer or
testimony alleged to have been given by the
defendant as set forth in the information and
bill of particulars on file herein was in fact
given that the same was a voluntary statement
of the defendant and wholly immaterial to any
issue in any cause then and there pending before a court. of competent jurisdiction.
(e) That the purported complaint beforr
Arthur B. Bringhurst, the alleged J w;;tice of
the Peace of the Third Precinct, Salt LakP.
County, Stat~ of Utah, purportedly charging:
this defendant with having driven an auto~
mobile on the 21st day of April, 1939 in Salt.
Lake County, without a driver's license was
not filed nor does the same state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense and that
the purported testimony of this defendant before the alleged Justice of the Peace, if given
at all, was a nullity and not made or giveJll in
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any cause in any court of any cOinpe~ent jurisdiction.
\VHERE:B.,ORE, defendant and appellant prays
that the foregoing may be considered by this
court as his assignments of error and that the
judgment appealed from be reversed and re
manded or that a judgment be entered ~accord
ing to law and the views of this Court.

HARLEY W. GUSTIN,
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant.
Duly served.
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